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In  addition to taxing future consumption (including leisure),  capital 
income taxation subsidizes the consumption of durables.  The taxation of 
future consumption  may be characterized as an intertemporal distortion,  while 
the subsidy to durables may be characterized as a static distortion.  The 
magnitude of this intertemporal distortion has received considerable 
attention,  but few analyses have dealt with the static distortion. 
This paper decomposes the excess burden arising from capital income 
taxation into its static and intertemporal components.  The analysis is based 
on a life-cycle model with a constant elasticity of substitution  utility 
function in one durable and one nondurable good.  Calculations indicate that 
for reasonable utility parameters, the static component of the excess burden 
is of the same order of magnitude as the intertemporal component.  In the case 
of major durable goods such as housing,  which have relatively low depreciation 
rates, the static component is large and may exceed the intertemporal 
component.  This suggests that an additional tax on the purchase of new 
durable goods would significantly reduce the overall excess burden arising 
from a capital income tax. 
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This paper examines the excess burden that arises from the imposition of 
a capital income tax.  It is well known that such a tax leads to both static 
and intertemporal distortions.  First,  a tax on capital income implicitly 
subsidizes the consumption  of durable goods if the imputed rent income from 
these goods is not equally taxed.  Second,  by lowering the net rate of 
interest,  a capital income tax lowers the price of current consumption 
relative to future consumption.  Most studies of the welfare losses that 
result from capital income taxation focus exclusively either on the static or 
the intertemporal distortion. 
Some early studies (Harberger [1966],  Shoven [1976]) examine the static 
aspect of the excess burden by investigating the welfare cost that emerges 
when various sectors of an economy face different tax rates.  Subsequent 
studies (Levhari and Sheshinski [1972],  Feldstein [1978]) extend the analysis 
to an intertemporal framework.  Chamley (1981) analyzes the welfare cost of a 
capital income tax in an intertemporal general-equilibrium model in  which 
household consumption,  labor supply,  factor prices,  and capital stock are all 
endogenous.  Auerbach, Kotlikoff,  and Skinner (1983) construct a general- 
equilibrium simulation  model to assess the efficiency gains that result from 
dynamic tax reform.  Auerbach (1989) develops an  overlapping-generations 
general-equilibrium model to measure the relative magnitudes of distortions 
associated  with capital income taxation across industries, assets, and time. 
Under capital income taxation, income from the services of durable goods 
is excluded from the tax base, partly because such income is hard to impute. 
However,  there appears to be no single study that compares the static and 
intertemporal components of the excess burden resulting from capital income 
taxation.  A number of studies recommend eliminating the capital income tax in 
order to avoid the intertemporal distortion.  However, its elimination may be 
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schemes devised to reduce or to eliminate the static component of the 
distortion could minimize the welfare loss associated with a capital income 
tax.  Hence, understanding the relative magnitudes of these two distortions 
may be important for setting tax policy. 
This study measures the magnitudes of the excess burdens attributable to 
these static and intertemporal distortions through the use of a 60-period 
model of life-cycle consumption.  In  this model, the representative agent's 
preferences are specified in a time-separable constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function in one durable and one nondurable good. 
We use compensated taxes and subsidies on consumption of the durable good to 
decompose the total excess burden into its static and intertemporal 
components.  The wealth equivalent measure of excess burden is computed.  This 
method requires calculation of the reduction in the present value of resources 
that results in the same loss of utility as that arising from a fully 
compensated tax scheme. 
Is the overall excess burden from a capital income tax equal to the sum 
of its static and intertemporal components?  The theoretically correct answer 
is no.  However,  our analysis and computations reveal that, for reasonable 
parameter values, the difference between the sum of these two components and 
the combined excess burden is negligible.  We also show that the static 
component of the excess burden is independent of the intertemporal elasticity 
of  substitution,  and that the intertemporal  component is neutral with respect 
to the within-period elasticity of substitution  between durables and 
nondurables  . 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section IIA 
describes a life-cycle model of consumption  with one durable and one 
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nondurable good.  Sections IIB,  IIC,  and IID present the formulations for 
three different compensated tax schemes used to decompose the total excess 
burden into its static and intertemporal components.  Section IIE discusses 
the excess burdens obtained for the three compensated tax schemes from 
computations based on a 60-period time horizon, and also examines the 
sensitivity of the excess burdens to changes in various parameters.  Section 
111 summarizes and concludes. 
11. Compensated Capital Income Taxes in a Life-Cvcle Model 
A.  The Model 
The consumer is assumed to live for T periods and to maximize a time- 
separable utility function given by: 
where ut is given by the CES form: 
Nt is consumption of the nondurable good in period t,  and St is the stock 
of the durable good held in period t.  We assume that the consumption  of the 
durable good is proportional to the stock held.  This allows the stock of the 
durable good rather than the flow of services from it to be used as an 
argument in the utility function.  The parameter 7  is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution,  p is the within-period elasticity of substitution 
between the nondurable and the durable good,  0  is the within-period intensity 
of preference for consumption of the durable good, and /?  is the rate of time 
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lifetime.  The arguments in the single-period utility function  are displaced 
by unity in order to obtain a lower bound on utility when consumption  of 
either good is zero. 
The maximization is subject to the following budget constraints: 
t = 1,  ...,  T,  and 
In these constraints,  At and Dt represent the financial assets and the 
stock of the durable good, respectively,  at the beginning of period t.  6 is 
the rate of depreciation of the durable good over a single period, and p is 
the relative price of the durable good.  The consumer is assumed to receive a 
wage,  W,  of unity at the beginning of each period.  Purchases of the two goods 
are also assumed to occur at the beginning of each period.  The difference 
St-Dt thus represents the addition to the stock of the durable good in period 
t.  Equations (3) and (4) are asset accumulation conditions that indicate how 
consumption choice in period t affects the portfolio of assets available at 
the beginning of period t+l.  Equation (5)  is a terminal asset value 
constraint.  It specifies that the total expenditure on the nondurable good 
and on the net addition to the stock of the durable good at the beginning of 
the last period cannot exceed the sum of the financial assets held and wages 
received at the beginning of the period plus the discounted value of the 
depreciated stock of the durable good that is assumed to be sold at the end of 
the period. 
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equations for index t+l, for all t where 15  t 5  T,  yields the lifetime budget 
constraint facing the consumer: 
1  1  1 
(6)  PVR  =  C W(l+r)  =  C N+(l+r)  +  c pqS+(l+r) (1-t) , 
where q =  (r+&)/(l+r).  Taking N1 as the numeraire,  pq  is the rental cost of a 
unit of the durable good; it represents the costs due to forgone interest and 
depreciation incurred by holding a unit of this good for one period.  The 
right side of equation (6)  is the present value of total expenditures on the 
two goods over the agent's  lifetime,  and the left side is the present value of 
resources.  Viewed in this way, the intertemporal maximization problem is 
isomorphic to a static consumer choice problem.  There are 2T goods with 
relative prices that equal their respective coefficients in equation (6).  The 
indirect utility obtained by maximizing equation (1)  subject to equation (6) 
is  : 
T 
PVR  +  (l+pq) C R (t-1) 
t=l  1 
Here,  B  = l/(l+B>, R  = l/(l+r),  g = 1-(l/-y),  and f  = 1-(l/p). 
B. A Fully Compensated Capital Income Tax 
Now consider the imposition of a fully compensated capital income tax at 
rate 7,  where 0  < 7  < 1.  The net rate of interest is rn = r(1-r).  It is 
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occur at the end of each period.  The lifetime budget constraint applicable in 
this case is: 
T  T  T  T 
(8) PVR - X Wt(l+rn)  X Ct(l+r  )-t  = X Nt(l+rn)  (I-')+  x pqnSt(l+r  ) (  1-t  >  n  n  t=l  t=l  t=l  t=l 
Here,  qn =  (rn+6)/(l+rn),  and Ct stands for the lump-sum compensation  paid 
back at the end of period t.  Under full compensation,  Ct must equal the 
revenue collected from the capital income tax at the end of period t for all 
t=l,..,T. This implies that the budget constraint is the same as it would be 
under no taxation.  However,  as is evident from equations (6) and (8),  the 
relative prices of the 2T goods change when the capital income tax is imposed 
Take N1 as the numeraire again.  Because aqn/ar  = -r(l-6)/(l+rn)2  < 0,  in any 
given period the relative price of consumption of the durable good vis-a-vis 
consumption of the nondurable good is lower than the same relative price in 
the no-tax  case.  This represents the static subsidy implicit in a capital 
income tax.  Further,  since a  [l/(l+rn)  ]/a7  = r/(l+rn)*  > 0,  the price of 
consuming either good in any period t is lower relative to the price of 
consuming the same good in a future period t+s  (s 1  1).  This represents the 
intertemporal distortion favoring earlier consumption that is introduced by a 
capital income tax.  Maximize equation (1)  subject to the constraint in 
equation (8).  Then solve for the demand functions using the resultant first 
order conditions and the no-tax budget constraint (equation [6]), 
Resubstitute the demand functions into equation (1) to obtain the indirect 
utility function for the compensated tax scheme: 
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PVR +  (l+pq)  C R  (  t-1) 
t=l  1 
Let Xc stand for the percentage reduction in PVR necessary to equate the 
pre-tax  utility,  V,  with the post-tax utility, Vc.  To obtain the analytical 
formula for Xc, replace PVR in equation (7) with PVR(l+Xc),  equate the 
resultant expression to equation (9),  and solve for A,: 
T 
where A =  (l+pq)  C  R  (t-1) 
t=l 
C. The Static Component of Excess Burden 
A measure of the static (durables versus nondurables) component of the 
excess burden arising from a capital income tax can be obtained by replacing 
the tax with an equivalent compensated subsidy on consumption of the durable 
good.  This removes the intertemporal distortion,  but preserves the static 
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good.  The equivalent rate of subsidy,  a,  can be written as: 
The lifetime budget constraint relevant for this case is then: 
1  1 
(12)  PVR =  Z  Wt(l+r)  C Ht(l+r)  (1-t) 
t=l  t=l 
Here,  Ht is a lump-sum tax levied at the beginning of period t.  This serves 
as a (negative) compensation against the subsidy,  a,  on the consumption of the 
durable good.  There are two alternative but equivalent ways to view this 
subsidy.  One can think of it as subsidizing either 1)  the rental cost of 
holding the durable good for one period or 2)  the purchase of new stocks of 
the durable good. 
Let pa = p(1-a)  represent the net purchase price of new durable goods. 
Maximize equation (1)  subject to equation (12) and use the first order 
conditions and the no-tax budget constraint (equation [6])  to obtain 
consumption demand functions.  Resubstitute these into equation (1)  to obtain 
the indirect utility function: 
T 
PVR +  (l+pq) C R  (  t-1) 
t=l  1" 
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to the static distortion,  A,,  is then: 
Note that the static excess burden is independent of 7, the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution. 
D. The Intertemporal Component of Excess Burden 
To isolate the intertemporal distortion in relative prices that results 
from a capital income tax,  one must retain the compensated capital income tax 
and, in addition, levy a compensated tax on the consumption of the durable 
good.  The latter must be levied at a rate equivalent to the rate of subsidy 
on the consumption of the durable good that is implicit in the capital income 
tax.  Such a tax neutralizes the distortion in the within-period relative 
price of nondurable versus durable consumption,  but preserves the distortion 
in relative prices of consumption across periods.  The equivalent tax rate,  p, 
on the consumption  of the durable good is given by: 
The lifetime budget constraint now becomes: 
T  T  T 
(16)  PVR  =  X Wt(l+rn)  X ct(l+rn)-5  X Gt  (l+rn) (1-t) 
t=l  t=l  t=l 
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compensate for the tax,  p,  levied on consumption of the durable good in each 
period.  Since the capital income tax is maintained, the corresponding 
compensations,  Ct,  for each period t also enter the budget constraint.  As in 
the case of the subsidy,  the tax on the durable good can likewise be viewed 
either as a tax on the rental cost of holding the good for one period,  or as a 
tax on the purchase of new stocks of durables. 
Let pp - p(l+p)  represent the gross price of new stocks of durable goods. 
The indirect utility function can then be derived by maximizing equation (1) 
subject to equation (16),  using the first order conditions and the no-tax 
budget constraint (equation[6]) to obtain consumption demands,  and 
resubstituting these into equation (1): 
T 
1  PVR +  (l+pq) x R  (  t-1) 
t=l 
(17)  Vm =  1 
where ppqn = pq.  Hence,  the excess burden due to the intertemporal 
distortion,  A,,  can be written as: 
T  -. 
(l/g) 
PVR + A  n 
-1. 
T  I 
(l/g) 
a 
Note that A,  is not a function  of p, the within-period elasticity of 
substitution between the durable and nondurable goods. 
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It is possible to show that the sum of the static and intertemporal 
components of excess burden is almost equal to the combined excess burden 
from a capital income tax.  Equations (14) and (18) can  be written in an 
abbreviated fashion as: 
(14a) As = F(PVR)  (X - 1) ,  and 
Here,  F(PVR)  =  [(PVR+A)/PVR],  X is the term in equation (14) involving p,  pu, 
q,  8,  and p, and Y is the term in equation (18) involving B,  R,  Q, and 7. 
Note that puq = pqn.  Hence,  equation (10) can be written as: 
(10a) Xc = F(PVR)  (XY - 1). 
Adding equations (14a) and (18a) yields: 
(19)  Am+  As = F(PVR)  [(XY - 1) - (1 - X)(1  - Y)]. 
It is easily verified that LimT,O  X = LimT,O  Y = 1.  Hence,  for small values 
of T,  the sum of Am and As  closely approximates A,. 
E. Results with a 60-Period Time Horizon 
In order to obtain the wealth equivalent measure of excess burden, it is 
necessary to make assumptions about the utility parameters p, 7,  6,  8,  and P, 
the pre-tax rate of interest,  r,  the relative price of the durable good,  p, 
and the rate of capital income taxation,  T.  To do this,  we select base-case 
values for the different utility parameters based on the findings of other 
empirical studies.  We then examine the magnitude of the wealth equivalent 
measure and its sensitivity to changes in different parameters for each of the 
three compensated tax schemes. 
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establishes a range of between 0.77 and 1.23,  but the hypothesis that p  equals 
unity cannot be rejected.  For purposes of this study,  we set the base-case 
value at unity. 
For 7,  values of 0.28 (Ghez and Becker [1975]),  0.07-0.35 (Grossman and 
Schiller [1980]),  and < 0.1 (Hall [1988]) have been reported.  We have 
selected the base-case value of 0.2. 
For B, we have chosen the base-case value of 0.8,  which makes the share 
of expenditures on the durable good equal to 50  percent of that on the 
nondurable good when the rate of capital income taxation is zero. 
We have set the base-case values of both r and p  at 0.03.  The relative 
price of the durable good,  p,  has been set so that the cost of holding one 
unit of the durable good for one period equals the cost of purchasing one unit 
of the nondurable good in the no-tax case;  that is,  pq =  1. 
A reasonable depreciation rate on major durable goods such as housing is 
3 percent per year,  but the rate on durable appliances is much higher.  Hence, 
a base-case value of 0.05 has been used for 6. 
The base-case parameters yield values of 0.45  percent for the static 
component,  0.61 percent for the intertemporal component, and 1.06 percent for 
the combined excess burden.  The static component is thus 74  percent as large 
as the intertemporal component, accounting for roughly 42  percent of the 
combined figure  . 
Figures 1 through 8 show the response of excess burden to changes in the 
various model parameters.  The numbers plotted represent the percentage 
reduction in PVR required under the no-tax case to obtain the same utility 
level as under the relevant compensated tax scheme.  In each case,  all 
parameters other than the one under consideration are set to their base-case 
levels  .' 
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rises from about 0.8  percent to about 1.3  percent in response to a change in p 
from 0.5 to 1.5.  As expected,  the intertemporal component does not change 
when the value of p is altered.  At high values of p (p 1  1.2), the static and 
intertemporal components are approximately equal. 
Figure 2 shows the response of excess burden to changes in 7.  The 
combined excess burden increases from about 0.75  percent to about 3.1 percent 
when -j is increased from 0.1 to 0.9.  Again,  as expected, the static component 
is not responsive to changes in the value of -j.  For values of -j less than 
0.15,  the static component is larger than the intertemporal one.  The two 
components are of similar size for values of 7  in the range of the empirical 
estimates mentioned earlier. 
Figure 3 indicates that increasing the rates of interest and time 
preference simultaneously while maintaining equality between them results in 
larger excess burdens.  However,  the rate of increase of the intertemporal 
component is greater than that of the static component. 
The expression for Am  (equation [18])  does not involve 6.  Hence,  the 
intertemporal component is not responsive to changes in the depreciation  rate. 
The static and the combined excess burdens, on the other hand, are negatively 
related to 6.  This can  be shown  by differentiating equation (11) with respect 
to 6: 
Figure 4  shows that the combined excess burden declines from about 1.48 
percent to 0.95  percent when S  is increased from 3 percent to 6  percent.  For 
low values of 6,  the static component exceeds the intertemporal component. 
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durable goods such as housing,  which have low depreciation  rates. 
Figure 5 shows the response of excess burden to changes in B.  As 
equation (18) indicates,  B  plays no role in determining the size of the 
intertemporal component.  Note that the static and the combined excess burdens 
are not very sensitive to changes in B.  Hence,  even for a wide range of 
expenditure shares on the two goods,  the static component is of the same order 
of magnitude as the intertemporal component. 
The responses of the static,  intertemporal, and combined excess burdens 
to an increase in r  are plotted in figure 6.  In conformity with the rule that 
excess burdens increase with the square of the tax rate,  the figure shows all 
three curves rising at an increasing rate. 
Figure 7 shows that the combined excess burden increases from 1.06 
percent to about 2.8 percent when r is increased from 3 percent to 6 percent. 
Equations (14) and (18) show that the time preference rate,  /3,  only affects 
the intertemporal component,  while figure 8 demonstrates that this effect is 
very small.  Changing the value of /3  from 3 percent to 6 percent changes the 
intertemporal component from 0.61  percent to 0.57  percent and the combined 
excess burden from 1.06 percent to 1.02 percent. 
I  11. Conclusion 
We show that the static component of the excess burden that arises from 
capital income taxation is sizable.  For base-case values of the utility and 
other parameters, the static component is about three-fourths as large as the 
intertemporal component.  Sensitivity results indicate that for some 
parameter values consistent  with the findings of other empirical studies,  the 
static component may even exceed the intertemporal component.  Our analysis 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmalso reveals that under a CES utility specification,  the sum of the static and 
intertemporal components is approximately equal to the combined excess burden. 
Furthermore, the static distortion caused by capital income taxation can 
be substantial in the case of major durable goods such as housing,  which have 
relatively low rates of depreciation.  Hence,  given capital income taxation, 
the imposition of an additional tax on the purchase of new durable goods could 
lessen the overall excess burden by reducing or eliminating the static 
distortion in consumption choice between durables and nondurables. 
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